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Abstract
In this paper we investigate audit pricing for ﬁnancial institutions. We modify the
standard audit fee model for industrial companies by incorporating measures of risk
and complexity that are either unique to or more relevant for banks, and that are used
by bank regulatory agencies. For a sample of 277 ﬁnancial institutions in ﬁscal 2000, we
ﬁnd that audit fees are higher for banks having more transactions accounts, fewer
securities as a percentage of total assets, lower levels of eﬃciency, and higher degrees of
credit risk. Higher fees also obtain for savings institutions, for banks that are more
involved in acquisition activity, and for institutions that are required by regulatory
agencies to maintain higher levels of risk-adjusted capital. Our model reveals that the
complexities and risks deemed most important by regulatory agencies are also those that
tend to be priced by audit ﬁrms. The importance of the audit process for banks is likely
to intensify in the future as regulatory changes increase the importance of market discipline in controlling bank risk-taking.
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1. Introduction
Banking organizations comprise over 20% of the total public equity market
capitalization in the United States. Moreover, banks are vital to the operation
of our domestic economy in their role as depository institutions and lenders to
both corporations and individuals. Despite the economic importance of the
banking industry, however, accounting researchers have done little to investigate the various relationships that exist between banks and their auditors. We
examine one such relationship––that of audit pricing––by using extensive
industry-speciﬁc disclosures to determine which client-speciﬁc characteristics
are the primary drivers of bank audit fees.
Our setting is relevant for a number of reasons. First, in the spirit of Beaver
(1996), the setting allows us to extend the general audit fee model into a very
rich institutional context. Speciﬁcally, most audit and assurance fee studies
(e.g., Simunic, 1980; Francis, 1984; Defond et al., 2000; Copley and Douthett,
2002) exclude ﬁnancial institutions because banks are ‘‘diﬀerent.’’ That is, although the same general theoretical constructs (size, risk, and complexity)
should drive fees for all types of organizations, a number of the empirical
proxies typically included in fee models––e.g., ﬁnancial leverage, current or
quick ratio, inventory and receivables as a percentage of total assets––are not
meaningful for banks. The fee model developed in this paper incorporates
numerous measures that are unique to the banking industry, thereby providing
a framework within which bank audit pricing can be examined empirically.
An investigation of the relationship between bank regulatory bodies and
audit ﬁrms is also important due to the high levels of litigation risk in this
industry. 1 Unlike industrial companies, the litigation risks associated with
bank audits stem from actions brought by both shareholders and the federal
government. For example, in November of 1992 Ernst and Young was required to pay the US government $400 million––almost ten times larger than
the largest previous settlement for professional ﬁrms––to settle claims related
to thrift failures. According to counsel for the Oﬃce of Thrift Supervision, this
ruling and others like it have eﬀectively established ‘‘. . .a standard for now and
the future to govern the audit of depository institutions’’ (Rosenblatt, 1992).
Because bank auditors are subject to such extensive regulatory scrutiny, we
believe that bank audit fees are likely to be tied to regulatory risks. If such ties
serve to moderate the litigation risks associated with bank audits, our paper
could be useful to accounting ﬁrms as they evaluate their litigation exposure in
this high-risk industry.

1

Palmrose (1988) shows that banks and savings and loans were responsible for more audit
litigation cases than any other three-digit SIC code between 1960 and 1985.
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Our analysis is also important to parties other than auditors. Financial
institutions are primarily responsible to their respective regulatory authorities.
Regulatory agencies, in turn, rely heavily on the work of external auditors as
they make their evaluations of banksÕ ﬁnancial condition. It is therefore in the
interests of many diﬀerent parties that bank audits emphasize factors that are
important to regulators. Stated diﬀerently, an audit function that fails to
adequately address important regulatory considerations would expose both
bank shareholders and the public at large (as users of the banking system) to
unnecessary risks. By examining the relationship between fees charged by audit
ﬁrms and the primary regulatory risks that exist for banks, our paper speaks to
this issue directly.
Finally, and more generally, our study is relevant because auditors are
vitally important to the banking system. For example, under the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision New Basel Capital Accord, the assessment
of capital adequacy depends partially on the market discipline that stems
from increased transparency of a bankÕs ﬁnancial condition. The audit function plays an integral role in providing this transparency. Furthermore,
changes in the bank audit system that have occurred since the savings and
loan crisis of the 1980s have raised questions about whether the private
audit will eventually become a substitute for the public (i.e., governmental)
audit. Indeed, in a number of countries––Canada, Denmark, New Zealand,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom––the role of private auditors has
expanded substantially, even to the point of replacing public audits. Given
this potentiality, the increased role of market discipline as mandated by
Basel, and the need for reliable information at the base of the regulatory
structure, it is important that we develop an understanding of the eﬀectiveness
and eﬃciency of the bank audit process. Our initial analysis of the determinants of bank audit fees may serve as a springboard for future research in this
area.
Our tests are based on a sample of 277 banks in ﬁscal 2000. For these banks,
our results show that audit fees are strongly related to many of the risk factors
deemed important by federal regulatory agencies. We ﬁnd that audit fees are
higher for banks having more transaction accounts and higher degrees of credit
risk and capital risk. Higher fees also obtain for institutions that are less eﬃcient operationally and that are more heavily involved in acquisition activity,
while banks with more transparent asset portfolios beneﬁt from fee discounts.
Finally, savings institutions are charged a signiﬁcant premium relative to other
banks. We contend that this premium likely is attributable to diseconomies of
scale in the thrift audit market as well as to the prevalence of complex mortgage-related hedging strategies among these types of institutions. It is also
possible, however, that premiums for S&Ls are simply holdovers from the
extensive litigation associated with these organizations during the savings and
loan crisis of the 1980s.
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We also examine the relationship between bank audit fees and auditor
industry specialization. Similar to Mayhew and WilkinsÕ (2003) investigation of
industrial ﬁrms, we ﬁnd that an economy of scale-based fee discount does
obtain in the bank audit market. However, unlike industrial ﬁrm auditors, the
leading bank auditors appear to be unable to use their market dominance to
recapture this fee discount. One possible explanation for this ﬁnding is that
dominant bank auditors price their audits more competitively than they perhaps could in order to gain access to clients with greater (and higher margin)
non-audit service needs. Our analysis of the relationship between non-audit
fees and audit fees for the top two bank audit ﬁrms supports this notion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections
we provide background information on bank risks and develop our test variables. In Section 4 we describe our sample and in Section 5 we present our data
and empirical results. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.

2. Institutional background
Following the banking and thrift crisis of the 1980s, Congress mandated
that depository institutions have an external audit performed annually by a
public accounting ﬁrm. The requirement that both public and private ﬁrms in
an industry have an external audit is unique to depository institutions and
imposes a ﬁnancial burden that is not felt by non-bank competitors. The
external audit adds cost and complexity to the extensive audit requirements
that are already in place for depository institutions. Speciﬁcally, in addition to
the internal audit requirements that exist in this industry, the external audit
requirements supplement yet another audit by examiners from the various
regulatory authorities––the Oﬃce of the Controller of the Currency (OCC), the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Federal Reserve
System (FRS) for commercial banks, and the Oﬃce of Thrift Supervision
(OTS) for thrifts.
Because managers of banks and thrifts ultimately are answerable to their
primary regulatory authority, it seems reasonable to suggest that the audit
function should be driven by variables and ratios that these regulators consider
important. Indeed, Congress has given regulators the power to close banks and
thrifts if their ﬁnancial condition is unsatisfactory, even if they are solvent.
Moreover, the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 established a risk-based deposit insurance system in which the cost of deposit insurance to the individual
bank or thrift is based on evaluations of risk––evaluations which make
extensive use of the work of external auditors. In summary, banks are subject
to signiﬁcant regulatory pressures and regulatory agencies rely heavily on
auditors in making their evaluations of ﬁnancial condition. The combination of
these two factors leads us to believe that public accounting ﬁrms will (and
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should) focus their audits on the factors deemed important by regulatory
agencies.
The bank risk and complexity proxies we present in this paper are based
primarily on the models of the FDIC and the FRS. While the agencies diﬀer
somewhat in the exact measures they emphasize, substantial commonalities
exist. The FRS adopted the Uniform Bank Surveillance System in the mid1980s in order to track the ﬁnancial performance of banks. The system was
structured around ﬁnancial ratios that measured the capital adequacy of the
bank as well as its earnings, liquidity, and loan quality. During the same
period, the FDIC developed the CAEL (Capital, Asset quality, Earnings, and
Liquidity) Surveillance System. 2 More recently, the FRS has developed the
Financial Institutions Monitoring System (FIMS) to provide information on
the ﬁnancial condition of banks and thrifts. 3 The primary focus of the FIMS
System is on asset quality, but the model also includes capital adequacy,
earnings, and investment security ratios as well as asset growth rates.
Based upon the similarity of the variables in these diﬀerent regulatory models,
we focus our fee model on the following dimensions of bank risks: liquidity risk,
operating risk, credit risk, capital or solvency risk, and market risk. Liquidity
risk relates to the possibility that the bank cannot meet its obligations for cash
through the clearing system or from its depositors. Operating risk refers to the
possibility of high operating costs depleting the capital account of the bank.
Banks with high operating risk will ﬁnd it diﬃcult or impossible to earn
acceptable proﬁt without taking unacceptable risk. Credit risk primarily involves
the quality of the bankÕs assets and the probabilities of default in its loan portfolio, though credit risk may also exist in the securities portfolio. Capital risk
refers to the potential that shrinkage in the value of assets will deplete the bankÕs
equity account. Finally, market risk involves the potential for negative impact on
the bankÕs ﬁnancial viability from adverse movements in interest rates. We develop our empirical proxies for these measures below.

3. Regulatory risks and their association with audit fees
3.1. Overview
Extant theory suggests that audit fees should be a function of the size of the
client, the risk of the client, and the complexity of the clientÕs operations. It is
2
The CAEL System is a variant of the CAMEL (Capital, Asset quality, Management, Earnings,
and Liquidity) rating that is used internally by bank examiners. A sixth acronym––S––was added to
CAMEL in 1997, representing Sensitivity to market risk. See Lopez (1999) for a discussion of the
evolution of the CAMEL rating system.
3
See Cole et al. (1995) for details.
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important to note, however, that what are termed ‘‘bank regulatory risks’’ are
likely to possess elements of both client risk and client complexity. For
example, a bank could be viewed as ‘‘risky’’ because it has complex contracts
with high-risk borrowers. In these and other cases it would be extremely difﬁcult, if not impossible, to tease out the audit fee eﬀect attributable to ‘‘client
complexity’’ and the audit fee eﬀect attributable to ‘‘client risk.’’ As a result,
while we frame our empirical proxies in terms of their regulatory constructs
(i.e., risks), their inﬂuence on audit fees is likely to stem from both factors (i.e.,
risk and complexity).
3.2. Liquidity risk
Our two primary proxies for bank liquidity risk involve transactions accounts and investment securities. Transactions accounts normally include noninterest-earning demand deposit accounts (DDAs), interest-bearing checking
accounts in the form of negotiable order of withdrawal accounts (NOWs), and
automatic transfer from savings (ATS) accounts. Money market deposit accounts (MMDAs) are also often included as transactions accounts, though the
number of transactions is limited in these accounts. Demand deposit accounts
are held by individuals, corporations and governmental entities. However,
most DDAs are held by corporations because they are prohibited from holding
interest-bearing NOW accounts.
Transactions accounts arise from the basic banking function of providing a
means of payment to consumers and businesses. Banks with large numbers of
transactions accounts necessarily have much more complex activities that are
costly to perform and to monitor. Moreover, large numbers of transactions
accounts are usually associated with a signiﬁcant number of ATM machines
and a large inventory of currency and coin, which are also costly to maintain
and monitor. The Federal ReserveÕs functional cost analysis reported in 1999
that the direct cost of providing transactions accounts was 3.11% per year. In
contrast, the direct (non-interest) cost of time deposits was only 0.42%,
reﬂecting their much greater simplicity in processing and monitoring. Banks
with a higher proportion of transactions accounts have higher liquidity risk
and greater operational complexity. Therefore, these banks should have higher
audit fees.
With respect to investment securities, most bank portfolios are comprised of
relatively short-term, liquid instruments having reasonably stable, veriﬁable
values. For example, corporate and foreign debt securities have made up less
than 3% of the total securities portfolio of commercial banks in recent years.
Fraser et al. (2001) report that about 25% of securities held by commercial
banks have maturities of less than one year, while almost 40% have maturities
between one and ﬁve years. Because liquidity risk is decreasing in the proportion of total assets held as securities, banks holding more securities should
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have lower audit fees. Fees may also be negatively related to investment
securities because the relative transparency of the asset portfolio should make
the associated audit work less complicated.
3.3. Operating risk
A commonly used measure of operating risk for banking organizations is the
eﬃciency ratio––deﬁned as the ratio of total operating expense to total revenue
(net interest income plus non-interest income). The higher the eﬃciency ratio
(i.e., the lower the eﬃciency for the bank), the more diﬃcult it is for the bank to
earn a proﬁt and thus to bolster its capital account. High eﬃciency ratios stem
from large non-interest expenses relative to revenue generation. Typically, large
non-interest expenses––principally for personnel, branches, and data processing––are associated with large volumes of transactions accounts and with a
geographically diverse branch system. As such, the eﬃciency ratio could also be
viewed as a proxy for the complexity of bank operations. We anticipate that less
eﬃcient banks should have higher audit fees, both because transaction volume
and geographic dispersion should complicate the audit function and because
fees should be increasing in a bankÕs operating risk.
3.4. Credit risk
Credit risk is the principal risk faced by most banking organizations. Our
measures of bank credit risk relate to banksÕ loan portfolio composition and to
loan quality. Commercial loans typically involve commercial and industrial
loans, loans to depository institutions, acceptances issued by other banks, and
obligations (other than securities) of states and political subdivisions. We also
include commercial mortgage and agricultural loans in our deﬁnition of
commercial loans. These loans are made for short-term working capital purposes such as to ﬁnance receivables and inventory, and for expansion of plant
and equipment. Many commercial loans are extended under open lines of
credit whereby the timing and the amount of the loans are determined by the
actions of the borrower.
Commercial loans are complex transactions and frequently involve signiﬁcant collateralization. Furthermore, the audit and evaluation of a commercial
loan portfolio is diﬃcult because the portfolio lacks transparency, thereby
increasing measuring and monitoring costs. Moreover, commercial loans are
increasingly syndicated. 4 For the originator and creator of the syndicate,

4
Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) report that over $1 trillion of commercial loans were syndicated
in 1997. Banks tend to syndicate larger loans from higher quality borrowers and keep smaller loans
from lower quality borrowers on their own balance sheets.
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issues often arise as to the potential liabilities of the originator for loans sold
into the syndicate. For buyers of syndicated loans, generally smaller banks, the
portfolio is appreciably more diﬃcult to evaluate because the buying bank did
not perform the primary credit evaluation for the loan. Because banks with
high concentrations of commercial loans are likely to have greater credit risk
and less loan portfolio transparency, we expect to ﬁnd a positive relationship
between audit fees and the proportion of commercial loans in an institutionÕs
total loan portfolio. This relationship is likely to be particularly important for
banks having a large number of non-performing loans and/or inadequate loan
loss reserves.
In recent years, losses on commercial and industrial loans have exceeded
those on other types of bank loans with the exception of loans to individuals
(especially credit card loans). 5 However, the credit risk associated with higher
loss ratios on loans to individuals is mitigated by the very high interest rates
on these loans and by their small size. Stated diﬀerently, the small size of most
individual loans makes their net loss ratios as a group both small and highly
predictable. In contrast, commercial loans tend to be large––in many cases,
large enough that a few defaults could threaten the viability of the lending
bank. Auditors associated with such banks could be exposed to signiﬁcantly
higher levels of litigation risk, given that one of their principal audit
responsibilities is to verify the adequacy of the loan loss reserve account. In
fact, failure to audit loan loss allowances in accordance with GAAS was noted
as a key factor both in the Ernst and Young $400 million 1992 ruling mentioned previously and in a $187 million 1994 ruling against KPMG Peat
Marwick.
Our ﬁnal measure of credit risk involves residential mortgage loans. Residential mortgage loans generally involve bank loans secured by 1–4 family
residences. The loans typically have very low default rates and, even in default,
the loss to the bank lender is usually small. However, the growth of securitization––by which most residential mortgage loans are packaged as securities
and sold to outside investors––has had a substantial eﬀect on the risk and
complexity of these loans. Loan securitization does reduce the lenderÕs credit
risk; however, banks often engage in substantial hedging strategies to mitigate
the interest rate risk during the time that these loans are held prior to their
packaging into portfolios. The relative lack of transparency in these hedging
strategies suggests that audit eﬀort (and hence, audit fees) should be an
increasing function of the proportion of residential mortgage loans in a given
institutionÕs portfolio. Stated diﬀerently, while credit risks certainly exist in a
residential mortgage loan portfolio, the complexity associated with auditing

5

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Quarterly Banking Performance. Fourth Quarter,
2000.
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the associated hedging strategies may be the primary incremental determinant
of audit fees.
3.5. Capital risk
Our main proxy for capital risk is the total risk-adjusted capital ratio, deﬁned as the total amount of bank regulatory capital (i.e., common equity,
perpetual preferred stock, loan loss reserves, and some types of subordinated
debt) divided by risk-weighted assets. Banks are required to maintain a minimum risk-adjusted capital ratio of 8%. Audit fees should be increasing in the
clientÕs level of capital risk; however, the relationship between audit fees and
the risk-adjusted capital ratio could conceivably be positive or negative.
Practically speaking, riskier banks are often required by regulators to maintain
larger regulatory capital cushions. In this instance a positive relationship would
be expected between the risk-adjusted capital ratio and audit fees. However it is
also reasonable to think that banks are riskier, by deﬁnition, when they have
lower levels of risk-adjusted capital. As a result, although we anticipate that
regulators are relatively proactive with respect to this particular measure, we
do realize that a negative relationship between risk-adjusted capital and audit
fees may exist.
We also include intangible assets as a proxy for capital risk, though the link
is less direct than with the risk-adjusted capital ratio. Bank intangibles typically
represent goodwill resulting from mergers and acquisitions. Banks with large
amounts of intangible assets are likely to be more complex organizations
and may also be viewed as having relatively aggressive, risk-taking management (due to their acquisition activities). Because goodwill is deducted in
the calculation of regulatory capital, banks that are aggressive in their risktaking through acquisitions may impair their capital account. In sum, intangibles combine aspects of complexity and capital risk; as a result, we expect
that banks with high relative levels of intangible assets will have higher audit
fees.
3.6. Market risk
A sixth measure of bank ﬁnancial condition was added to the CAMEL
rating system in 1997. This measure––S, for ‘‘Sensitivity’’ (resulting in CAMELS)––is designed to determine the extent to which the proﬁtability of the
bank and the value of its assets and liabilities are sensitive to changing market
conditions. Because most of the assets and liabilities of banking organizations
are ﬁxed-rate debt instruments, the regulatory focus for this measure typically
is interest rate risk. We measure interest rate risk as interest-sensitive assets
minus interest-sensitive liabilities. A value of zero would indicate that the bank
is perfectly matched and should experience little change in proﬁt or asset

62

L.P. Fields et al. / Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 23 (2004) 53–77

valuation due to interest rate changes. A positive (negative) value is indicative
of an asset- (liability-) sensitive position, whereby a bankÕs value should increase with increasing (decreasing) interest rates. Thus, the relationship between fees and interest rate sensitivity likely will depend on a bankÕs exposure
(asset- versus liability-sensitive) at a given point in time.

4. Data and summary statistics
Our sample consists of 277 banking organizations that reported audit fees in
their 2000 ﬁscal year proxy statements. These organizations, which represent
the banking subset of a hand-collected database of audit fees for approximately
5000 ﬁrms in ﬁscal 2000, include commercial banks and their holding companies as well as savings institutions and their holding companies. Due to the
growing similarity among these institutions and for ease of discussion, we refer
to all of the organizations in the sample as ‘‘banks.’’
Data for our sample of banks were collected from Sheshunoﬀ Information
ServicesÕ Bank Source database. Selected summary measures are presented in
Table 1. Because we have a large number of variables, we restrict our discussion in the text to those that we believe are most important in establishing
general ﬁrm characteristics and in making comparisons to industry-wide
measures. Column 1 of Table 1 describes the summary measure and Column 2
presents the name of the associated regression variable. Our multivariate model
uses logarithmic transformations of both audit fees and total assets; however,
for ease of interpretation the untransformed values are presented in Table 1.
Furthermore, due to the presence of a few very large organizations (e.g., Bank
of America, Wells Fargo, and Bank One reported total assets at year-end 2000
of more than $250 billion) our emphasis is on median values.
Table 1 (Panel A) shows that ﬁrms in our sample range in market capitalization from roughly $7 million (First Southern Bancshares) to over $95 billion
(Wells Fargo), with a median value of $132 million. Total assets have a median
value of approximately $1.2 billion and median year-end deposits are $945
million. The median audit fee for the banks in our sample is $124,000, comprising roughly 2% of the absolute value of net income. Similar to the other
measures, the distribution of net income across our sample ﬁrms is wide,
ranging from a loss of over $500 million to a proﬁt of over $7.5 billion. Our
measure of general equity risk, the standard deviation of stock returns for one
year preceding the end of the 2000 ﬁscal year, is commonly used in the
assurance fee literature. The standard deviation of returns for our sample is
much lower (median of 2.7%) than that typically documented in studies of IPO
ﬁrms. This result is not surprising, of course, because established ﬁrms, particularly banks, are likely to have lower levels of equity risk than ﬁrms that
have recently entered the public equity markets.
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Table 1
Selected summary data for 277 bank holding companies reporting audit fees for ﬁscal 2000
Variable

Regression
Variable

Panel A: Financial information
Audit fee ($ mil)
LOGFEE
Market value of equity
–
($ mil)
Total assets ($ mil)
LOGASS
Total deposits ($ mil)
–
Net income ($ mil)
–
Std. Dev. of returns (1 year) STDRET
Transaction accounts/total
TRANSACCT
deposits
Securities/total assets
SECURITIES
Eﬃciency ratio
EFFICIENCY
Commercial loans/gross
COMMLOAN
loans
Non-performing loans/gross NONPERloans
FORM
Net charge-oﬀs/loan loss
CHGOFF
reserve
Mortgage loans/gross loans MTGLOAN
Risk-adjusted capital ratio
CAPRATIO
Intangible assets/total assets INTANG
(rate sens. assets rate-sens.
SENSITIVE
Liabs)

Mean

Median

Min

Max

0.306
2013

0.124
132

0.022
7

13.175
95,181

9537
6132
109
0.028
0.200

1204
945
11
0.027
0.199

150
82
)511
0.008
0.006

642,191
364,244
7517
0.086
0.531

0.229
0.622
0.434

0.217
0.608
0.417

0.097
0.306
0.001

0.580
2.067
0.949

0.008

0.006

0.000

0.066

0.181

0.139

)0.492

1.895

0.323
0.136
0.009
0.060

0.305
0.125
0.004
0.040

0.000
0.081
0.000
)0.469

0.998
0.540
0.071
0.696

Audit ﬁrm

# Audits

Median
audit fee
($ mil)

Median
client
assets
($ mil)

Median
client
MVE
($ mil)

Panel B: Auditor information
KPMG Peat Marwick
Ernst & Young
Arthur Andersen
PriceWaterhouseCoopers
Deloitte & Touche
Crowe & Chizek
Grant Thornton
All others

69 (25%)
39 (14%)
38 (14%)
28 (10%)
25 (9%)
19 (7%)
9 (3%)
50 (18%)

0.124
0.250
0.173
0.188
0.138
0.077
0.081
0.073

1,250
4,611
1,405
2,785
1,021
562
630
449

141
795
174
441
183
58
106
45

The mean and median values for the eﬃciency ratio––our proxy for bank
operating risk––are both approximately 60%, suggesting that for the banks in
our sample, roughly 60 cents of every dollar of revenue goes to pay operating
expenses. The FDICÕs Quarterly Banking Proﬁle reported that all banks
averaged an eﬃciency ratio of 58.4% in 2000, so our sample banks appear to be
comparable to the industry as a whole. Table 1 (Panel A) also provides
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information on loan portfolio composition and credit risk. Over 40% of our
banksÕ loans are commercial loans and over 30% are mortgage loans. However,
both of these measures range from roughly zero to almost 100%, indicating
that distinct areas of loan specialization exist for diﬀerent ﬁnancial institutions.
For example, roughly 41% (25%) of the loans made by the 38 thrifts in our
sample are mortgage (commercial) loans, relative to only 26% (43%) for the
239 other banking organizations. Across all of our sample observations less
than one percent of loans, on average, are classiﬁed as non-performing. This
is a relatively low number by historical standards.
The remaining measures in Panel A are proxies for capital risk or market
risk. For our 277 banks the median risk-adjusted capital ratio is 12.5%. For
comparison purposes, the risk-adjusted capital ratio for all banks as of
December 31, 2000, was 12.13%. The FDICÕs 2000 Quarterly Banking Proﬁle
reported that for banks with over $10 billion in assets the ratio was 11.48%,
and for smaller banks (assets of less than $100 million) the ratio was 17.44%.
Assuming size is negatively correlated with risk, these summary ﬁgures suggest that higher levels of risk-adjusted capital could be indicative of pressures placed on smaller banking organizations by governmental regulatory
agencies.
In Table 1 (Panel B) we break down selected data items by audit ﬁrm. Panel
B reveals that KPMG has the highest audit market share (25%) in our sample,
when market share is deﬁned in terms of the number of institutions audited.
However, their clientsÕ median market capitalization is smaller than that of the
other Big 5 ﬁrms and they have the lowest median audit fee as well. As a point
of contrast, Ernst and Young audited 30 fewer banks but their gross audit fees
of $21,443,250 were signiﬁcantly higher than the $17,085,131 earned by
KPMG. It is also interesting to note that 28% of the banks in our sample were
audited by non-Big 5 accounting ﬁrms. While early studies involving public US
companies reported comparable rates, recent work has documented non-Big 5
market share levels of only 5% to 15%. Because banks are subject to high levels
of litigation risk, our ﬁndings with respect to audit market share are consistent
with the contention of Simunic and Stein (1996) that increased litigation risk is
likely to result in a shift from larger to smaller audit ﬁrms.

5. Fee model and results
5.1. Bank audit fee model
To date, the only fee analysis directly related to banks is by Stein et al.
(1994), who investigate the determinants of fees and labor hours for 108
ﬁnancial services companies. Stein et al. (1994) use survey data from 1989 to
show that fees for ﬁnancial institutions are related to size and operational
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and reporting complexity (as deﬁned by the auditor), as well as to the
auditorÕs assessment of the clientÕs assistance and internal control systems.
While Stein et al.Õs (1994) work is a vital ﬁrst step in extending the audit fee
literature to the US banking industry, it is diﬃcult to compare to recent fee
studies both because the survey data come from a single public accounting
ﬁrm and because its focus on proprietary, auditor-reported measures makes it
diﬃcult to ascertain which ﬁnancial characteristics drive bank audit fees. 6
Our audit fee model builds from speciﬁcations commonly used in the audit
and assurance fee literature. We regress audit fees on measures of ﬁrm size,
complexity and risk while controlling for industry (explicitly, given that our
sample is comprised entirely of banks), time (because the sample is based on
a single year of audit fees) and auditor quality. The form of the model is as
follows:
LOGFEEj ¼ c0 þ c1LOGASSj þ c2BIG5j þ c3LOSSj
þ c4STDRETj þ c5TRANSACCTj
þ c6SECURITIESj þ c7EFFICIENCYj
þ c8COMMLOANj þ c9NONPERFORMj
þ c10CHGOFFj þ c11MTGLOANj
þ c12CAPRATIOj þ c13INTANGj
þ c14SENSITIVE þ c15SAVINGSj þ ej

ð1Þ

In Eq. (1), LOGFEE is the natural logarithm of the audit fee, LOGASS is
the natural logarithm of total assets, and BIG5 is an indicator variable
deﬁning ﬁrms using Big 5 auditors. Based on previous research we expect
the coeﬃcients for LOGASS and BIG5 to be positive. LOSS and STDRET
are proxies for ﬁrm risk that often are used in the fee literature. LOSS is
an indicator variable deﬁning banks having net losses during the 2000 ﬁscal
year and STDRET is the corresponding one-year standard deviation of daily
stock returns. Although a positive coeﬃcient for both variables might reasonably be expected, results from previous studies are mixed (and often
insigniﬁcant).
Our test variables, which are deﬁned both in Section 3 and in Table 1, are
represented by coeﬃcients c5 through c15. As discussed previously, higher
values for TRANSACCT would be indicative of increasing organizational

6
Stein et al. (1994) do note that, unlike industrial ﬁrms, bank audit fees are not signiﬁcantly
related to ﬁnancial leverage. However, they do not investigate alternative, industry-speciﬁc
ﬁnancial proxies for risk or liquidity.
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cost, complexity, and liquidity risk; therefore, c5 should be positive. With
respect to our other measure of liquidity risk, securities are liquid assets that
are also comparatively easy to value. As a result, audit risk and eﬀort should be
decreasing in SECURITIES. So that the directional predictions for this measure align with those of the other risk measures, SECURITIES is operationalized in the regression model as [1 minus (securities/total assets)]. A positive
coeﬃcient for c6 would therefore indicate that audit fees are higher for banks
with lower relative levels of securities to total assets.
Greater operating eﬃciency implies lower operating risk and may also
provide a signal as to the eﬀectiveness of bank management. We expect ﬁrms
that are more eﬃcient (lower value for EFFICIENCY) to have lower audit
fees. The next four variables––COMMLOAN, NONPERFORM, CHGOFF,
and MTGLOAN––proxy for bank credit risk. Our earlier development suggests that audit fees should be increasing in these measures of risk. CAPRATIO and INTANG are our main proxies for capital risk. To the extent that
higher values of CAPRATIO are indicative of increased regulatory pressure,
we expect c12 to be positive. Similarly, because more complex, risk-taking
banks are likely to have higher relative levels of intangible assets and because
goodwill decreases banksÕ regulatory capital, banks with acquisition activity
require greater audit eﬀort and have higher capital risks. Therefore, the coefﬁcient estimate for INTANG should be positive.
The ﬁnal two variables in Eq. (1) are SENSITIVE and SAVINGS. Because
interest rates generally were rising during 2000 (beneﬁting asset-sensitive
banks), we expect a negative relationship between SENSITIVE and audit fees.
We realize, however, that gap measures typically are noisy representations of
interest rate risk; as a result, we expect the relationship between LOGFEE and
SENSITIVE to be weaker than the relationship between fees and the other
measures of risk and complexity. SAVINGS is an indicator variable that takes
a value of 1 if the ﬁrm is a thrift or savings institution and 0 otherwise. While
commercial banks and thrifts have grown much more alike in recent years and
perform similar deposit-taking and lending functions, thrifts tend to be more
focused on residential real estate lending. The substantial hedging associated
with the securitization of residential mortgage loans creates signiﬁcant valuation issues both internally for managers and externally for auditors. We
anticipate that these complexities should increase audit costs. Furthermore,
thrifts are both smaller and less widespread than commercial banks and, historically, have been subject to greater litigation risks. 7 For all of these reasons
we expect a positive coeﬃcient for SAVINGS.

7

The FDIC reported that there were 8315 commercial banks and only 1590 thrifts (Historical
Statistics on Banking) as of the end of 2000.
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5.2. Initial results
We report the results from estimating Equation (1) in Table 2. In almost
every case the coeﬃcient estimates are both statistically signiﬁcant and of the

Table 2
Audit fee model for 277 banks at ﬁscal year-end 2000
Variable

Expected sign

Coeﬃcient estimate

t-Statistics

INTERCEPT
LOGASS
BIG5
LOSS
STDRET
TRANSACCT
SECURITIES
EFFICIENCY
COMMLOAN
NONPERFORM
CHGOFF
MTGLOAN
CAPRATIO
INTANG
SENSITIVE
SAVINGS

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
)
+

2.4761
0.5265
0.2229
0.0139
0.4349
0.0045
0.6978
0.0066
0.0071
0.0800
0.0018
0.0036
0.0088
0.0791
)0.0007
0.1575

5.97
30.00
4.51
0.10
0.18
2.02
3.06
3.57
3.87
2.34
1.69
2.01
1.79
3.94
)0.49
2.52

Adjusted R-square

0.877

LOGFEEj ¼ c0 + c1LOGASSj + c2BIG5j + c3LOSSj + c4STDRETj + c5TRANSACCTj + c6SECURITIESj + c7EFFICIENCYj + c8COMMLOANj + c9NONPERFORMj + c10CHGOFFj + c11MTGLOANj + c12CAPRATIOj + c13INTANGj + c14SENSITIVEj + c15SAVINGSj + ej.
Because directional predictions are made, p-values are one-tailed;  ,  denote p < 0:01, <0.05,
respectively.
LOGFEE ¼ logarithm of audit fee.
LOGASS ¼ logarithm of total assets.
BIG5 ¼ 1 if auditor is a Big 5 accounting ﬁrm, ¼ 0 otherwise.
LOSS ¼ 1 if bank had a net loss for the year, ¼ 0 otherwise.
STDRET ¼ standard deviation of daily returns for 250 trading days preceding ﬁscal year-end.
TRANSACCT ¼ total transaction accounts/total deposits.
SECURITIES ¼ [1 ) (total securities/total assets)].
EFFICIENCY ¼ eﬃciency ratio (total operating expenses/total revenue).
COMMLOAN ¼ total commercial and agricultural loans/gross loans.
NONPERFORM ¼ nonperforming loans/gross loans.
CHGOFF ¼ net charge-oﬀs/loan loss reserve.
MTGLOAN ¼ total domestic real estate and home equity loans/gross loans.
CAPRATIO ¼ total risk-adjusted capital ratio.
INTANG ¼ intangible assets/total assets.
SENSITIVE ¼ rate-sensitive assets minus rate-sensitive liabilities.
SAVINGS ¼ 1 if organization is a savings institution, ¼ 0 otherwise.
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expected sign. 8 Consistent with studies involving industrial companies, fees are
higher for large ﬁrms and are higher if the auditor is a Big 5 ﬁrm. We also ﬁnd
that both of our industry-speciﬁc measures of liquidity risk are statistically
signiﬁcant. TRANSACCT is positively related to audit fees, indicating that
ﬁrms with a greater proportion of transaction accounts require more attention
from auditors. The positive relationship between audit fees and SECURITIES
(again, where SECURITIES is deﬁned as 1 minus securities/assets) is consistent
with banks charging more to audit banks that have less liquid, less transparent
asset portfolios.
Our proxy for operating risk, EFFICIENCY, is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant, as are our proxies for loan complexity and credit risk. Audit fees
are increasing in both commercial loans (COMMLOAN) and residential
mortgage loans (MTGLOAN). Both of these ﬁndings are consistent with the
contention of Khurana and Kim (2003) that loans involve a relatively large
amount of subjectivity (and hence more audit attention) with respect to
determining fair value. The coeﬃcient estimates for NONPERFORM and
CHGOFF are positive and signiﬁcant as well, indicating that auditors demand
more from banks that have lower quality loan portfolios. Given that loanrelated issues were cited as a primary factor in the two major rulings mentioned
earlier in the paper, the importance of these variables in our fee model may be
indicative of audit ﬁrmsÕ concerns regarding potential litigation.
The ﬁnal four variables in Eq. (1) are CAPRATIO, INTANG, SENSITIVE
and SAVINGS. The coeﬃcient estimate for SENSITIVE is not statistically
signiﬁcant; therefore, auditors do not appear to price bank market risks. An
alternative explanation, as mentioned previously, is that interest rate sensitivity
disclosures simply do not adequately capture banksÕ market risks. Table 2 does
reveal a positive, signiﬁcant relation between the risk-adjust capital ratio
(CAPRATIO) and audit fees. This ﬁnding indicates that auditors charge more
to audit banks that are required by regulators to maintain higher levels of
regulatory capital. The signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient estimate for INTANG
suggests that a premium is charged for audits of banks that have a history of
acquisition activity. Finally, the coeﬃcient estimate for SAVINGS reveals a
signiﬁcant premium for audits of savings institutions. 9 We contend that diseconomies of scale, hedging, and litigation issues are likely to be responsible for
this premium.

8
With respect to regression diagnostics, there is no evidence of problematic multicollinearity or
heteroskedasticity. The largest variance inﬂation factor is 2.83 and the p-value for the presence of
heteroskedasticity is 0.75. When we use t-statistics adjusted in the manner of White (1980), our
results are not qualitatively diﬀerent than those presented in Table 2. Furthermore, there is no
evidence of non-normality in the residuals.
9
There are 38 savings and loan institutions in our sample (14% of total observations). Our
results do not change when we eliminate these observations from the model.
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In summary, our ﬁndings suggest that of the factors included in monitoring
systems developed by federal regulatory agencies––namely liquidity risk,
operating risk, credit risk, capital risk, and market risk––all except market risk
are reﬂected in fees charged by bank auditors. The explanatory power of our
model is also higher (adjusted r-square ¼ 88%) than that which typically is
reported in the fee literature, suggesting that the presence of signiﬁcant regulatory pressures may strengthen the association between fees and client-speciﬁc
risks. Finally, the economic magnitude of the audit pricing eﬀects stemming
from these risk factors is non-trivial. For example, the regression model presented in Table 1 would predict an audit fee of $125,584 for a bank that (a) is
not a savings institution, (b) has a Big 5 auditor, (c) has positive earnings, and
(d) reports the median value of all other independent variables. Holding all
other factors constant, a mere 10% increase in the nine signiﬁcant bank risk
factors would increase the predicted audit fee by over 18%, to roughly
$148,600. If the bank were a savings institution as well, the predicted fee would
rise to almost $174,000. These increases from the baseline audit fee for the
‘‘median bank’’ illustrate the economic signiﬁcance of bank risks in audit
pricing.
5.3. Large versus small banks
Large banks typically have much more complex ﬁnancial proﬁles and more
sources of liquidity than small banks as well as considerably diﬀerent risk
proﬁles. For example, Demsetz and Strahan (1997) show that large bank
holding companies are allowed to operate with lower capital ratios and typically engage in more risky activities. These and other factors suggest that the
pricing of bank audits may diﬀer, based on the size of the institution. In Table 3
we presents results from estimating the basic model separately for ‘‘large’’ and
‘‘small’’ banks. Our size distinction is determined by whether the bank has total
assets above or below the median level (approximately $1.2 billion) for the
entire sample. 10
Table 3 shows that a few items––size, audit quality, operating eﬃciency, and
commercial loans––are priced comparably for both large and small banks.
However, several important diﬀerences obtain as well. For example, mortgage
loans and intangible assets positively impact fees at large banks but not at
small banks. We conjecture that these relationships may simply reﬂect the

10
As in our full sample model, there is no evidence of problematic multicollinearity,
heteroskedasticlty, or non-normality in either the small bank subsample or the large bank
subsample. The largest Variance Inﬂation Factor for the small (large) bank subsample is 4.71
(2.21). The p-values for tests of heteroskedasticlty and non-normality for small (large) banks are
0.62 (0.52) and 0.64 (0.95), respectively.
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Table 3
Audit fee model results for above-median asset versus below-median asset banks
Variable

INTERCEPT
LOGASS
BIG5
LOSS
STDRET
TRANSACCT
SECURITIES
EFFICIENCY
COMMLOAN
NONPERFORM
CHGOFF
MTGLOAN
CAPRATIO
INTANG
SENSITIVE
SAVINGS
Adjusted R-square

Expected
sign

Above-median

Below-median

Asset
banks

t-Statistics

Asset
banks

t-Statistics

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
?
+

1.7064
0.5697
0.3026
)0.0574
8.4414
0.0087
0.2797
0.0061
0.0081
0.1145
)0.0003
0.0055
0.0062
0.1027
)0.0024
0.1464

2.77
18.31
3.10
)0.28
1.68
2.60
0.78
2.44
3.10
1.60#
)0.17
2.33
0.73
3.54
)0.96
1.45#

2.8401
0.5238
0.2012
0.1479
)2.3729
)0.0001
0.6556
0.0081
0.0052
0.0561
0.0033
0.0009
0.0095
0.0504
)0.0006
0.1414

3.04
9.51
3.56
0.59
)0.83
)0.01
2.12
2.44
1.85
1.43#
2.01
0.32
1.50#
1.65
)0.36
2.09

0.857

0.536

LOGFEEj ¼ c0 + c1LOGASSj + c2BIG5j + c3LOSSj + c4STDRETj + c5TRANSACCTj + c6SECURITIESj + c7EFFICIENCYj + c8COMMLOANj + c9NONPERFORMj + c10CHGOFFj + c11MTGLOANj + c12CAPRATIOj + c13INTANGj + c14SENSITIVEj + c15SAVINGSj + ej.
Because directional predictions are made, p-values are one-tailed;  ,  , # denote p < 0:01, <0.05,
<0.10, respectively.
LOGFEE ¼ logarithm of audit fee.
LOGASS ¼ logarithm of total assets.
BIG5 ¼ 1 if auditor is a Big 5 accounting ﬁrm, ¼ 0 otherwise.
LOSS ¼ 1 if bank had a net loss for the year, ¼ 0 otherwise.
STDRET ¼ standard deviation of daily returns for 250 trading days preceding ﬁscal year-end.
TRANSACCT ¼ total transaction accounts/total deposits.
SECURITIES ¼ [1 ) (total securities/total assets)].
EFFICIENCY ¼ eﬃciency ratio (total operating expenses/total revenue).
COMMLOAN ¼ total commercial and agricultural loans/gross loans.
NONPERFORM ¼ nonperforming loans/gross loans.
CHGOFF ¼ net charge-oﬀs/loan loss reserve.
MTGLOAN ¼ total domestic real estate and home equity loans/gross loans.
CAPRATIO ¼ total risk-adjusted capital ratio.
INTANG ¼ intangible assets/total assets.
SENSITIVE ¼ rate-sensitive assets minus rate-sensitive liabilities.
SAVINGS ¼ 1 if organization is a savings institution, ¼ 0 otherwise.

greater amount of audit eﬀort required in evaluating the loan portfolios and
M&A activities of larger, more complex institutions. The ﬁnding with respect
to intangibles is also consistent with auditors pricing litigation risks more
aggressively for larger banks, as ‘‘improper accounting’’ for mergers and
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acquisitions was one of the primary drivers in the landmark rulings against
Ernst and Young and KPMG Peat Marwick.
CAPRATIO is marginally signiﬁcant ðp < 0:07Þ in the small bank subsample but is not signiﬁcant in the large bank subsample. The signiﬁcance of
CAPRATIO suggests that audit ﬁrms charge fee premiums for smaller institutions that are forced by regulatory agencies to maintain higher levels of riskadjusted capital, but that such premiums do not exist among large banks.
Again, this result is consistent with Demsetz and Strahan (1997), who suggest
that regulators allow large banks to operate with lower capital ratios. With
respect to SAVINGS, almost 60% of the savings institutions in the overall
sample are included in the small bank subsample. Therefore, the fact that
SAVINGS is only marginally signiﬁcant ðp < 0:07Þ in the large bank subsample may simply be a question of statistical power.
Finally, our measures of liquidity risk diﬀer substantially for small versus
large banks. The volume of transactions accounts (TRANSACCT) is signiﬁcantly and positively related to audit fees for the large bank subsample, but not
for the small bank subsample. This ﬁnding is intuitively appealing given the
much greater scale and complexity (both geographically and within the organizational structure) of large banks. With respect to SECURITIES, smaller
banks rely principally on securities to meet their liquidity needs while large
banks have many more options (e.g., through liability management techniques,
such as purchases of federal funds). As a result, the SECURITIES variable
likely is a cleaner proxy for liquidity risk for small banks than for large banks.
Our ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient for SECURITIES in the small
bank sample but not in the large bank sample is consistent with this notion.
5.4. Factor analysis of bank risks
In Section 3 we deﬁned and developed ﬁve primary risks that are viewed as
important by bank regulatory agencies. The models presented in Tables 2 and 3
incorporate ten diﬀerent measures in an attempt to proxy for these risks. Because there is likely to be some degree of overlap both across the diﬀerent risk
categories and between the variables we use within these categories, we used
factor analysis in an attempt to identify, empirically, the commonalities that do
exist.
Table 4 (Panel A) presents the standardized scoring coeﬃcients associated
with each of the four factors retained by the analysis. 11 None of our risk
proxies loads on more than one factor, and only one (EFFICIENCY) does not
load on any factor. We label Factor 1 ‘‘loan mix’’ as it loads exclusively on the
relative amounts of home mortgage loans and commercial loans in banksÕ

11

Estimates are based on the varimax orthogonal rotation method.
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Table 4
Factor analysis and revised bank audit fee model
Variable

Factor 1
‘‘Loan mix’’

Factor 2
‘‘Capital
risk’’

Panel A: Standardized scoring coeﬃcients for bank risk variables
TRANSACCT
0.116
)0.106
SECURITIES
0.048
0.512
EFFICIENCY
0.142
0.190
COMMLOAN
)0.457
)0.089
NONPERFORM
)0.036
)0.154
CHGOFF
)0.022
)0.009
MTGLOAN
0.489
)0.007
CAPRATIO
0.238
)0.433
INTANG
0.070
0.372
SENSITIVE
)0.061
0.068

Factor 3
‘‘Loan
quality’’

Factor 4
‘‘Interestrate risk’’

0.072
)0.128
0.228
)0.004
0.606
0.498
)0.041
0.041
)0.008
)0.041

0.648
0.158
0.120
0.016
)0.010
0.010
0.052
0.273
)0.050
0.491

Panel B: Regression model with factors included
LOGFEEj ¼ c0 + c1LOGASSj + c2BIG5j + c3LOSSj + c4STDRETj + c5SAVINGSj + c6LOANMIXj + c7CAPITALRISKj + c8LOANQUALj + c9RATERISKj + ej
INTERCEPT
LOGASS
BIG5
LOSS
STDRET
SAVINGS
LOANMIX (Factor 1)
CAPITALRISK (Factor 2)
LOANQUAL (Factor 3)
RATERISK (Factor 4)
Adjusted R-square

Coeﬃcient estimate

t-Statistics

4.4583
0.5103
0.2077
0.1090
0.2576
0.1627
)0.0051
0.1064
0.1123
0.0736

18.95
32.41
4.03
0.80
0.10
2.48
)0.23
4.70
4.75
3.43

0.863



Denotes p < 0:01.
Variables are as deﬁned in Tables 2 and 3. Bold print is used in Panel A to highlight coeﬃcients that
are signiﬁcant (in excess of 0.30).

portfolios. The second factor loads most heavily on SECURITIES, CAPRATIO and INTANG. The latter two factors are our primary measures of capital risk; further, investment securities are one of the major determinants of
the risk-adjusted capital ratio. As a result, we label the second factor ‘‘capital risk.’’ Factor three is labeled ‘‘loan quality’’ because it loads on NONPERFORM and CHARGEOFF. Our ﬁnal factor loads on SENSITIVE and
TRANSACCT. We label this factor ‘‘interest rate risk’’ because SENSITIVE
provides one deﬁnition of a bankÕs maturity gap and because the proportion of
transaction accounts relative to other funding sources has a signiﬁcant impact
on gap calculations.
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In Table 4 (Panel B) we replace our ten risk proxies with the four factors
described above. The loan mix factor does not appear to be important in an audit
pricing framework. However, audit fees are signiﬁcantly related to capital risk,
loan quality and interest rate risk. The ﬁt of this model is comparable (0.863) to
that of the model presented in Table 2 (0.877), and the signiﬁcance levels of the
remaining variables––LOGASS, BIG5, STDRET, LOSS and SAVINGS––are
directly comparable as well. Overall, our factor analysis allows for the development of a more parsimonious model of the manner in which accounting ﬁrms
price bank audits. It is also worth noting, however, that a number of distinct
factors are priced (not just a single generic ‘‘risk’’ factor), and that the underlying
components are consistent with the focus of regulatory agencies.
5.5. Auditor industry specialisation
Mayhew and WilkinsÕ (2003) analysis of IPO accounting fees shows that,
due to economies of scale, fees in general are decreasing in audit market share.
However, in industries where a ‘‘diﬀerentiated’’ auditor exists, that auditor is
able to recapture the economy of scale-based discount and earn a relative
premium for its services. 12 To test for these eﬀects in the banking industry, we
calculated the percentage of total sample bank assets audited by each
accounting ﬁrm to supplement the percentage of sample banks audited. 13 We
then included these two market share measures, alternatively, in our regression
model, as well as an indicator variable deﬁning the diﬀerentiated audit ﬁrm in
the banking industry. If the ﬁndings of Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) hold for
ﬁnancial institutions, the coeﬃcient for the market share measure should be
negative and the coeﬃcient deﬁning the diﬀerentiated audit ﬁrm should be
positive.
The estimation of this revised model requires identiﬁcation of the banking
industryÕs ‘‘diﬀerentiated’’ audit ﬁrm. Table 1 (Panel A) shows that KPMG
audited 25% of the banks in our sample and had a clear market share lead
based on that metric. However, KPMG audited only 16.1% of the total sample
assets, while PWC and Ernst and Young had asset-based market shares of
34.4% and 25.4%, respectively. As a result, it is not immediately clear which
audit ﬁrm, if any, is truly ‘‘diﬀerentiated’’ in the banking industry. We therefore estimated the model twice with KPMG and PWC deﬁned, alternatively,

12
To be classiﬁed as the diﬀerentiated auditor in an industry, Mayhew and Wilkins (2003)
require the audit ﬁrm to have the largest market share in the industry and to have a market share
lead of at least ten percentage points over its closest audit competitor.
13
Although these values are only rough estimates of audit market share in the banking industry,
they are superior to the measures that could be calculated from Compustat, as the ‘‘auditor’’ ﬁeld in
Compustat is missing for a vast majority of ﬁnancial institutions. We also used proportion of total
audit fees (for banks in our sample) as a measure of market share with no diﬀerence in results.
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as the diﬀerentiated audit ﬁrm. These two models are shown in the ﬁrst two
columns of Table 5.
When we deﬁne the diﬀerentiated audit ﬁrm in terms of the number of banks
audited, the audit market share measure (NUMPCT) is negative and marginally signiﬁcant ðp < 0:10Þ. The audit market share measure is negative and
more signiﬁcant ðp < 0:06Þ when we deﬁne the diﬀerentiated auditor in terms
of the proportion of total assets audited (ASSETPCT). These results generally
support Mayhew and WilkinsÕ (2003) analysis of IPO fees for industrial ﬁrms,
in that audit economies of scale seem to give rise to a negative relationship

Table 5
Industry specialization, non-audit services and bank audit fees
Variable

INTERCEPT
LOGASS
BIG5
LOSS
STDRET
TRANSACCT
SECURITIES
EFFICIENCY
COMMLOAN
NONPERFORM
CHGOFF
MTGLOAN
CAPRATIO
INTANG
SENSITIVE
SAVINGS
NUMPCT
ASSETPCT
SPECIALIST
NONAUDIT
Adjusted
R-square

Expected
sign

Model 1
Coeﬃcient

t-Statistics

Coeﬃcient

t-Statistics

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

2.2206
0.5397
0.3635
)0.0247
1.7920
0.0040
0.6588
0.0071
0.0077
0.0668

5.08
28.88
3.09
)0.16
0.70
1.90
2.76
3.68
4.01
1.87

2.4425
0.5295
0.3105
)0.0046
0.2044
0.0042
0.7006
0.0067
0.0070
0.0818

5.84
29.56
3.99
)0.03
0.08
1.91
3.06
3.62
3.78
2.37

2.2710
0.5410
0.2199
0.0070
0.9990
0.0045
0.7078
0.0067
0.0071
0.0806

5.28
27.93
4.46
0.05
0.41
2.03
3.11
3.66
3.86
2.37

+
+
+
+
)
+
)
)
+
)

0.0021
0.0041
0.0103
0.0829
)0.0003
0.1576
)1.4086
–
0.1719
–

1.84
2.19
2.01
3.95
)0.23
2.40
1.30#
–
1.15
–

0.0018
0.0037
0.0085
0.0830
)0.0006
0.1486
–
)0.4499
)0.0194
–

1.65
2.10
1.74
4.09
)0.42
2.37
–
1.56#
)0.37
–

0.0017
0.0036
0.0091
0.0775
)0.0007
0.1554
–
–
–
)0.0248

1.56#
2.02
1.88
3.87
)0.50
2.50
–
–
–
1.74

0.876

Model 2

0.877

Model 3
Coeﬃcient

t-Statistics

0.878

Because directional predictions are made, p-values are one-tailed;  ,  , # denote p < 0:01, <0.05 and
<0.10, respectively.
NUMPCT ¼ proportion of sample banks audited by audit ﬁrm.
ASSETPCT ¼ proportion of sample bank assets audited by audit ﬁrm.
SPECIALIST ¼ 1 if audit ﬁrm is industry leader based on NUMPCT (Model 1) or ASSETPCT
(Model 2), ¼ 0 otherwise.
NONAUDIT ¼ non-audit fees/audit fees.
All other variables are as deﬁned in Tables 2 and 3.
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between audit fees and audit ﬁrm market share. However, unlike Mayhew and
Wilkins (2003), the insigniﬁcance of SPECIALIST in both models suggests that
diﬀerentiated bank auditors are not able to recapture their economy of scalebased discount. We contend that the fact that KPMG dominates the industry
in terms of number of clients while PWC is the leader in total assets audited
prevents either ﬁrm from earning economic rents on the audit services they
provide. This explanation is generally consistent with Pearson and TrompeterÕs
(1994) analysis of audits in the insurance industry.
5.6. Non-audit fees
Another possible explanation for the inability of KPMG or PWC to earn an
audit fee premium is that diﬀerentiated auditors may price their audits relatively more competitively in order to gain access to more lucrative services. To
test this possibility, we calculated the ratio of non-audit fees to audit fees for
each sample bank and compared the median values across audit ﬁrms. For
Arthur Andersen, Deloitte and Touche, and Ernst and Young, the median
values of this ratio were 0.471, 0.365, and 0.564, respectively. For KPMG and
PWC, the numbers were signiﬁcantly higher––1.072 and 1.834. Taken in
combination with the ﬁndings presented in Section 5.5, these results are consistent with the two industry-leading audit ﬁrms focusing on clients with
greater demands for non-audit services, and pricing their audit services very
competitively in order to capture the higher margins associated with non-audit
work.
As a ﬁnal test of the importance of the provision of non-audit services in
the banking industry, we added the ratio of non-audit fees to audit fees to
equation (1) and re-estimated the model. These ﬁndings are presented in the
last column of Table 5. Although our univariate analysis suggests that
industry-leading audit ﬁrms––by virtue of the fact that they have the highest
levels of non-audit fee income––are likely to price their audits competitively,
we expect that all banks will discount their audit fees for clients with large
non-audit service demands. Consistent with this expectation, we ﬁnd that
the coeﬃcient for the non-audit fee ratio is negative and signiﬁcant
ðp < 0:04Þ. Furthermore, the measure remains signiﬁcant when KPMG and
PWC clients are removed from the model. 14 These ﬁndings suggest that,
across auditors, signiﬁcant audit fee discounts do exist when non-audit
service revenues are high. The two leading audit ﬁrms, however, seem to
have been the most successful at maintaining a client base that maximizes
non-audit fee revenue.

14

The coeﬃcient for NONAUDIT also remains signiﬁcant when SPECIALIST and either
NUMPCT or ASSETPCT is included in the model.
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6. Concluding remarks
In this paper we use extensive industry-speciﬁc disclosures to determine
which client characteristics are the primary drivers of bank audit fees. This
setting is relevant both because it allows us to extend the general audit fee
model into a very rich institutional context and because it allows us to investigate the extent to which bank audits are priced in accordance with federal
regulatory monitoring systems. Our ﬁndings indicate that audit fees are higher
for banks having more transaction accounts, fewer securities as a percentage of
total assets, higher eﬃciency ratios (i.e., less eﬃcient banks), and higher degrees
of credit risk. Higher fees also obtain for institutions that have higher riskadjusted capital ratios and more intangible assets, as well as for savings
institutions. Although eﬀort and billable hours are unobservable in our context, our ﬁndings with respect to fees are consistent with audit ﬁrms allocating
resources to areas documented as important by regulatory agencies.
We also ﬁnd that no single audit ﬁrm truly dominates the banking industry.
As a result, the top bank auditors are unable to earn a fee premium for their
presumably specialized services. An alternative viewpoint is that industryleading audit ﬁrms may forego an ‘‘audit specialization premium’’ in order to
gain access to clients with greater (and higher margin) non-audit service demands. Our ﬁnding that the two leading audit ﬁrms have clients with the
highest ratios of non-audit fees to audit fees supports this notion.
While our results provide signiﬁcant insights into the variables that determine audit fees at the individual bank and industry level, they also have
important policy implications. First, accounting ﬁrms that are not devoting
suﬃcient resources to audits of issues viewed as important by regulators may
wish to re-evaluate their procedures. A close tie with the internal audit function
and with the preferences of bank examiners would seem to mitigate the
extensive litigation risks that exist in the banking industry. Additionally, regulators rely heavily on external auditors as they make their evaluations of
banksÕ ﬁnancial condition. Given the cost savings and general eﬃciencies that
should exist if auditors align their processes with those of internal auditors and
bank examiners, bank managers may wish to suggest that their audit committees encourage such an alignment. A better mapping between these two
functions would also seem to beneﬁt both bank shareholders and the public at
large, to the extent that it reduces the likelihood of loss stemming from regulatory action.
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